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Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study of the viability of a fixed exchange rate regime which for brevity I refer to as a gold standard.
In a two-country world the monetary authority of each country guarantees the convertibility of its non-interest bearing fiat currency into gold at a fixed price. There is an exogenously given global stock of gold, which has no non-monetary uses. I therefore abstract from one feature of the historical gold standard, under which the international reserve asset had uses as a private consumption good and as an industrial intermediate good and raw material, and could itself be produced through an extractive production process. The essence of "gold'' in this model is that it is an "outside" non-interest bearing fiduciary asset whose aggregate quantity is exogenous to each private and public agent in the 1 global economic system and to the system as a whole.
By viability of the gold standard I mean its probability of survival and the expected duration of its survival. Special attention is paid to the way in which particular monetary, financial and fiscal policy actions, or rules, affect the viability of the system. The paper extends to a two-country setting the single country analyses of a collapsing managed exchange rate regime by Krugman [1979J, Flood and Garber [1983 , 1984a 1 For a more descriptively realistic analysis of certain aspects of the historical Gold Standard see e.g. Barro [1979J, Eichengreen [1984 , 1985a ,bJ, Barsky and Summers [1985J, Sardo and Schwartz (1984 . 2 These papers in turn were macroeconomic applications of the seminal paper by Salant and Henderson (1978] on collapsing commodity stockpiling schemes. My approach owes a lot to the work of Grilli (1986] who analysed buying and selling attacks on the same currency in a small country model. I use his idea of specifying two shadow floating exchange rates, one governing a buying attack and one governing a selling attack, although for the formal analysis in this paper I reduce these two to a single shadow floating exchange rate between two absorbing barriers. Flood and Garber (1983] use a log-linear continuous time stochastic two-country model to analyse a different class of problems <stochastic process switches> which could be formalized in terms of the behaviour of a stochastic process and a single absorbing barrier.
Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 develops the characterization of the "shadow floating exchange rate'' as a Wiener process, with or without drift, between two absorbing barriers. As long as the shadow floating exchange rate stays between the barriers (in the viable or safe range> the gold standard survives. When the shadow rate reaches either barrier, the gold standard collapses through a speculative selling attack on one of the two currencies.
Section 4 looks at the various ways in which policy actions can affect the shadow floating exchange rate process and thus the viability of the gold standard. It considers in detail those policy actions that, <leaving unchanged the nature of the shadow floating exchange rate process as a Wiener process with drift between two absorbing barriers 3 and leaving unchanged the variance of that process), alter the width of the viable range, the drift paramer (the instantaneous mean of the process) and the initial value of the shadow rate. Section 5 considers feedback policies that turn the (non-stationary> Wiener process into a stationary stochastic process. Section 6 looks at policies that can alter directly the variance parameter of the original Wiener process.
The Model
The two country model to be analysed is a linearized version of the model given in equations Cl> to ClOl. There is a single traded good. 131 is the law of one price.
Financial markets are efficient and there are risk-neutral speculators, so uncovered interest parity <UIPJ holds, as given in 141.Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t.
The total stock of gold in the world economy is exogenously given.
Consumption and production of gold are therefore ignored.
Each country maintains convertibility of its currency into gold as long as its stock of reserves exceeds an exogenously given critical 3 Most of the analysis is concerned only with differences between the values of country-specific variables such as domestic credit expansion, money demand growth etc. It may be helpful to think of country-specific or global variables <real output, the world price level under a fixed exchange rate> as not having any long-run trend. This makes the standard convention in this literature of specifying reserve floors or ceilings in nominal terms <rather than in real terms or relative to some nominal scale variable such as nominal income, trade or financial wealth) less objectionable. The analytically most convenient way of specifying the world commodity market equilibrium condition required to solve for individual countries' price levels and nominal interest rates, is to postulate a fixed ex-ante real interest rate. 4 * For algebraic convenience we also assume that M = S M . Choosing convergent forward-looking solutions for S and S we find where From the assumption of minimal g1obal reserve adequacy (eqn<lOll it follows that K > 0 and therefore that 9 <18c> S<t> > SCtl
We therefore rewrite condition <17> for viability of the fixed exchange rate system as:
Without loss of generality we can choose the lower bound to equal 5 zero.
Formally, the exercise we are performing can therefore be seen as the analysis of a continuous time stochastic process S between two absorbing barriers; the lower barrier 0 and the upper barrier K > 0. The independent increments dw, dw , dZ are not assumed to be contemporaneously independent. From the characterization of S as a Wiener process between two absorbing barriers, a number of propositions follow immediately.
Proposition 1. Under the conditions specified in Section 2, the gold standard collapses in finite time <with probability l>.
Proof. A Wiener process, with or without drift (i.e. with ~~ § O>, between two absorbing barriers is absorbed with probability 1 in finite time. See e.g. J. M. Harrison [1985, p. 43 ].
Note that the variance of the shadow floating exchange rate increases without bound as t increases. Any gold standard with a finite global stock of gold reserves will be non-viable, in the sense that a speculative attack will exhaust one country's reserves with probability one in finite time.
It is important to note that, at a point in time, the 'fundamental'
shocks to domestic credit and money demand are infinitesimal, i.e. of measure zero compared to the stock of reserves at that instant. It always takes a finite amount of time to achieve a finite change in the stock of reserves through the cumulative effect of these shocks. The finite, stock-shift rundown in a country's stock of reserves at the moment a speculative attack occurs, reflects the endogenous behaviour of speculators, not the occurrence of an exogenous shock that is large relative to the existing stock of reserves.
14 An implication of this specification of the exogenous shocks is that neither currency will ever be at a forward discount or premium, as long as the gold standard survives. At the instant a speculative attack brings down the gold standard, a forward discount or premium consistent with UIP may of course emerge.
Let r be the time at which the gold standard collapses, either
be the initial value of Sat t = 0 and let 1-' s and a~ be the drift and variance parameter of S. p<S 0 , S; t> is the conditional probability that S is at S at time t > 0 given that it starts at s 0 at time t = O, when there are two absorbing barriers, at K > 0 and at O, and with 0 < s 0 < K. Then (see Cox and Miller (1965, The moment generating function of T is * g ( y) = J e g ( t) dt for v 2: 0.
The moments of r <such as the first moment E 0 <rll are found by
For the Wiener process with drift ~' variance parameter oS' upper absorbing barrier K and lower absorbing barrier 0 < K, starting at s 0 ,
where -~ ± .J~ + 2 v o~ 2 OS From <27> and <28a, bl we derive the expected duration of the interval until the collapse given in <29, a, b>.
<29a> is derived from (29b) by applying L'Hospital's rule twice.
if J.ls ;:eO
Finally <see e.g. Cox and Miller (1965, Clearly, policies that widen the viable band by raising the upper limit reduce the probability of the collapse of the gold standard occurring through a selling attack on the home currency.
Note from the definition of Kin <lBb> that an increase in K means an increase in the global stock of reserves and/or a reduction in the countries' critical reserve thresholds. Since the experiment holds s 0 * constant (and .LJs>, the increase in R or reduction in RMIN or RMIN' must 20 * be accompanied by a reduction in 0(0) or an increase in D (0) <see 24c>.
Such a combination of events obviously makes it more likely that the collapse, when it occurs, will occur through a run on the foreign currency. The increase in world reserves is allocated to the home country.
2 * The effects of an increse in os and of an increase in fis on rr cs 0 > are given in <32c, d} below
The effect of policies that raise so' K, Os and .LJs on the expected duration of the period for which the gold standard survives are given in equations <33 a, b, c, dl. -r-s 0 c1 -exp<2.LJsK/osl> + K<l -exp<2.LJsS 0 10 5 >lJ. Therefore Q < 0 and A < 0.
22
( 33c > aE 0 have opposite signs and more information is needed to sign 011s
We now consider alternative policy actions at t = O, that maximize the expectation of the survival period of the gold standard.
Policies that Increase K.
From <18b> it is apparent that, given the values of the parameters <See Suiter (1976] for a discussion of these issues in a small country setting). 26 We can summarize the main findings of the discussion of increases in K as follows. the likelihood of the collapse of the gold standard, when it occurs, occurring through a selling attack on the currency of the country that has given up reserves, co-operative redistributions of reserves may be difficult to achieve without a mechanism for compensating the loser.
Policies that Change f!s· From <24al it is apparent that an increase in the difference between the expected rates of change of the home country's and the foreign country's stocks of domestic credit, increases J-ls· An increase * inµ -µ,which raises J-1s would, however, also raise s 0 <see <24c)), which is an increasing function of the "present discounted value" of all future expected dee differentials.
* To raise J-1s without also rai.sing s 0 . the increase in µ -µ must be * 
31
The variance of S(t) therefore increases linearly with t and S is nonstationary even if ~ = 0.
We maintain the assumption that Z(tl is governed by the Wiener process with drift given in (20cl, but permit the policy instruments to be governed by linear feedback rules that relate dee to the state variable S. For simplicity we assume that the feedback rules are exact or non-stochastic, i.e. that the only sources of noise in the system are * the money demands in the two countries, Z<tl. D<t) and D (t) can be * managed in such a way that F<tl = °M<D<tl-D (t) + R governed by and It is therefore rather straightforward <technically> to design dee feedback rules that turn the original non-stationary shadow exchange rate process into the stationary process given in (39>. The fact that <39> is stationary does not, however, resolve the problem of non-viability of the gold standard.
Proposition 5.
The gold standard whose shadow exchange rate is governed by the stationary process in <39) will collapse in finite time with probability 1.
Proof: The first order linear stochastic differential equation whose forcing variable is a Wiener process is known as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck <O.U.) process. In Cox and Miller [1965, p. 2334] it is shown that the stationary O.U. process is recurrent, i.e. any state is reached from any other state in finite time with probability 1.
Hence given any initi~l state s 0 , 0 < s 0 < K, the barriers will be reached in finite time with probability one. This proposition can be extended to higher order stationary linear stochastic processes with constant coefficients.
Flexible dee Rules and the Viability of a Gold Standard
From equation Cl5b> it is apparent that there exist policies for D and o* that ensure that the shadow floating exchange rate will never break through its upper or lower barrier. Policies that fix Sat any value between 0 and K preclude a speculative run on either currency. To achieve this, both the drift f1s <given in C24a) and the variance parameter o~ <given in C24b)) must be set equal to zero. To set the To reduce the variance parameter to zero, however, requires a highly contingent or conditional policy rule. It is e.g. not sufficient for the authorities merely to refrain from adding additional "noise" To ensure that the critical gold reserve thresholds will not be * violated and that debt default is ruled out, the primary deficit Ll (ill will have to be varied in response to exogenous shocks. The simplest policy that guarantees survival of the gold standard and government solvency is one where the primary deficit adjusts continuously to accommodate all real income-related changes in money demand, i.e. <44a"l CLl + iBldt = open market operations) and fiscal policy (variations in the primary deficit> will have to be specified through contingent or conditional rules.
Conclusion
The idealized two-country gold standard studied in this paper turns out to lack long-run viability unless monetary and fiscal policy are used very flexibly to offset the effects of independent exogenous shocks on international reserves and the public debt.
Absent a flexible dee policy which offsets the effect of money demand shocks on the stock of reserves, the gold standard collapses in finite time with probability 1. This collapse occurs through a speculative selling attack against one of the two countries' currencies, which brings that country's stock of gold reserves to its critical minimal threshold level. When this happens the monetary authority ends convertibility of the currency into gold at a fixed parity and a period of free floating commences.
Even when an eventual collapse is certain, there are once-off monetary and fiscal policy actions that can raise the expected duration of the "life" of the gold standard. An increase in the exogenous stock of international reserves (through a gold discovery or through the issuing of "paper gold" <S.D.R.'sl by a supranational monetary authority> raises the expected survival period of the gold standard.
For any given global stock of reserves, there exists an initial distribution of reserves that maximizes the gold standard's expected 42 lifetime. This distribution can be achieved through <stock-shift) open market.operations and adjustments in public sector primary non-interest deficits. Expected dee <the "drift" of the domestic credit stock process> can be adjusted by the monetary authorities to alter the "drift" of international reserves and of the "shadow floating exchange rate" whose behaviour determines the timing of the collapse and the currency that will be the subject of a selling attack.
The behaviour of international reserves in the "viable range" where each country's stock of reserves exceeds its critical threshold value, can in general be mapped into the behaviour of a shadow floating exchange rate between two absorbing barriers. The results summarized thus far hold for a world in which the exogenous variables <domestic credit and money demand> follow Wiener processes with or without drift.
When the exogenous variables are governed by Wiener processes, the shadow exchange rate is also a Wiener process. Since Wiener processes are non-stationary, it may be thought that the certainty of collapse in finite time is due to that specific feature of the model. This is not the case. Fairly simple dee feedback rules relating national dee differences tQ the level of the shadow floating exchange rate can transform the shadow floating exchange rate process into a stationary stochastic process. The proposition that a critical reserve threshold will be breached in finite time with probability 1 remains valid even for stationary shadow exchange rate processes. survival. This vulnerability of the gold standard should not come as a surprise of those who have studied the theory and history of commodity stabilization schemes which attempt to stabilize the price of some commodity by purchasing for or selling from a buffer stock. Formally, the gold standard is essentially an extreme version of such a commodity stabilization scheme, as it aims not merely to stabilize but to fix the price of a commodity. The same laws of probability that cause the 44 eventual collapse of commodity stabilization schemes, most recently in the.case of tin, jeopardize the long-run viability of a gold standard.
An issue which remains to be investigated is the extent to which the conclusions of this paper carry over to the case where international reserves consist Cperhaps in part> of the liabilities of one or more of the national monetary authorities and carry a market-determined rate of interest. When reserves can be borrowed with little or no financial penalty, the distinction between liquidity crises and solvency crises becomes blurred, and we should only expect to see a run on a nation's currency as one aspect of a default crisis affecting the whole of that nation's public debt.
